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ON NORMS. AN APPLICATION OF BRENNAN’S AND BICCHIERI’S 
IDEAS TO BAD CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
MARCO ANTONIO JOVEN-ROMERO* 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper I analyze the recent definitions of norm given by Brennan, 
Eriksson, Goodin, and Southwood in Explaining Norms (2013)1 and by Cristna 
Bicchieri in The Grammar of Society (2006).2 I illustrate the analysis with bad 
citizenship and civil disobedience phenomena, focusing on some particular 
cases: abortion, cyclist urban mobility, marijuana legalization, management of 
cultural and linguistic diversity, and squatter movements. 
In section 1, I introduce both views of norms, the methodology I use and the 
hypothesis I defend. In section 2, Norms in Brennan, Eriksson, Goddin, and 
Southwood’s ‘Explaining Norms’ (2013), I look at the agentialist definition of 
norm based on accountability. Depending on different forms of accountability 
and sanctions, the authors make a difference between individual moral norms, 
social non-formal norms, and formal norms. I pay special attention to proceses 
of norm emergence, persistence, change, unravelling and breaching, and to bad 
norms. In section 3, Norms in Bicchieri’s ‘The Grammar of Society’ (2006), I 
analyze the agentialist definition of norm based on her notion of expectations, 
and I relate it to statistical regularities. Depending on these expectations, 
Bichieri makes a difference between social norms, descriptive norms, and 
conventions and she considers a modular way of norm activation. In section 
3.1. I study the modular way of norm activation given by Bicchieri, in section 
3.2 I deepen in norm formation and in section 3.3 I mention Bicchieri’s ideas 
about civil disobedience. 
 
* I would like to thank Jesús Zamora Bonilla for his help when writing this article. I also would 
like to thank the rest of my colleagues at the Department of Logics, History, and Philosophy of 
Science at UNED. This research is part of the research project ‘Normative Inferences and 
Interferences in Scientific Research’ funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science (FFI2014-57258-
P) and my personal research is also developed thanks to the regional Aragonese Government. 
 1. See GEOFFREY BRENNAN ET AL., EXPLAINING NORMS 1–4 (2013). 
 2. CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF 
SOCIAL NORMS ix (2006). 
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In the conclusions section I sum up the findings and I defend that a broad 
integrative definition of norm including both accountability -Brennan et al.- 
and expected statistical regularity -Bicchieri- is necessary in order to work 
with norms and to apply them to bad citizenship and civil disobedience 
phenomena. 
  
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] ON NORMS, AN APPLICATION OF BRENNAN’S AND BICCHIERI’S IDEAS 325 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Ultimately, some fascinating books on norms have been published. Two of 
them are: Cristina Bicchieri’s The Grammar of Society (2006)3 and Brennan, 
Ekisson, Goodin, and Southwood’s Explaining Norms (2013)4 
On the one hand, The Grammar of Society offers an agentialist, reductive 
view of norms; on the other hand, Explaining Norms offers an agentialist but 
non-reductive view of norms. The former provides a definition of norm based 
on expectations – the agent expects some behaviors and he is expected to 
behave in a particular way by the group – while the latter gives a definition of 
norm based on accountability –evaluations and sanctions. Moreover, 
Explaining Norms shows a broader concept of norm including not only social 
norms but also formal norms (e.g. laws) and moral norms. This is useful in 
order to apply these philosophical ideas to contemporary social issues. 
Here, a comparative analysis of both approaches is presented, showing 
their similarities and differences, as far as both are agentialist but they disagree 
in norm definition. I apply the results to the analysis of bad citizenship and 
civil disobedience. From Bicchieri, bad citizenship can be obtained when 
expectations are not complied with,5 although we must take into account that 
decisions are conditioned by both dispositional and situational facts. From 
Brennan’s et al. point of view, bad citizenship emerges when particulars are 
negatively accounted because of their norm violation.6 Some agents consider 
the established norm a bad norm and they manage to change it just by 
breaching it. This conscientious objection usually has some common 
characteristics: it may have a cost on the agent and it must be advertised. 
I consider that a few agents initially find a moral motivation to act 
differently from the established social or legal norm. This new way of acting is 
not compatible with the instituted one. Quickly, some other agents feel similar 
attitudes because of a latent feeling, or practical reasons, and they all constitute 
a new group. We can start considering the initial moral motivation as a norm of 
this fresh community. At this step, the new norm creates both new common 
expectations and new criteria for accountability. Emergence and spreading 
may be caused by different processes: formal, if we find them institutional 
designed, or informal. Two of these processes are: free-flowing cascades and 
follow-the-leader actions. Then, a confrontation between the established 
community and the new one is likely to happen. If the process succeeds, norm 
unraveling usually meets some common characteristics: as we find more 
violators, we find fewer sanctions and less severity in them; normative 
principles are questioned and more and more people adopt the new behavior. It 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. See BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1. 
 5. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at ix–x. 
 6. See generally BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 234–44. 
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must be noted that when emerging and changing a norm, we may find 
incompatibilities of status: while a new norm may be followed as a social 
norm, it may be prohibited by formal institutions and codes. Also, norms may 
incorporate a social meaning, establishing new social roles and identities. 
Based on the above analysis, I finally defend an integrative view of norms 
that incorporates both accountability and expectations. Brennan et al. assume 
that the concept of norm has three different definitions7: a statistical one8, norm 
as a socially accepted rule9, or norm as an objective universal rule, by pro-
normativity philosophers. This last definition is quite polemic,10 but it is not 
the one I am interested here. I will go into the statistical and the accepted rule 
definitions, finally suggesting a broader concept of norm that includes both 
senses can explain better the processes of norm creation and change, and 
consequently, civil disobedience and bad citizenship. This view would join the 
two popular meanings of the concept of norm: statistical regularity–more 
specifically, expected statistical regularity – and accountability. 
I illustrate the previous ideas using some recurrent examples: abortion, 
cyclist urban mobility, legalization of marijuana, management of cultural and 
linguistic diversity, and squatter movements. 
2.  NORMS IN BRENNAN, ERIKSSON, GOODIN, AND SOUTHWOOD’S EXPLAINING 
NORMS (2013) 
Explaining Norms shows a broad concept of norm, including formal 
norms, social norms and moral norms .11 Generally speaking, this book 
promotes an agentialist but non-reductive definition of norm. Norms are 
autonomous entities created and followed by individuals and based on 
accountability.12 Thus, norms have a normative element (accountability) and a 
socio-empirical element (general norm knowledge). This definition of norm 
tries to solve the tension between a rational, individualistic definition,13 that 
defines the norm in terms of purposes and particular beliefs, and a 
constructivist approach, that gives the norm an autonomous nature. 
It should be noted that agents may have different purposes. That makes a 
difference between coordination, when peoples’ interests are aligned, and 
cooperation, when they are not. On the other hand, even if agents individually 
have the same goal, working as a group may demand them to change their 
goals and to act differently. 
 
 7. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 7. 
 8. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. 
 9. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. 
 10. STEPHEN TURNER, EXPLAINING THE NORMATIVE 193 (2010). 
 11. See generally BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 40–56, 57–92. 
 12. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 260. 
 13. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 3. 
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Rationalistic approaches explain why norms emerge in terms of agents’ 
purposes and beneficial outcomes, but they cannot explain how norms emerge 
and persist. Specific cases must be analyzed in order to get it. New purposes 
and beneficial outcomes are reasons for new norms emerging and 
establishment, and thus for oppositions and civil disobedience: thinking about 
abortion, their defenders usually argue for psychological benefits of pregnant 
women and the problems of having unwanted children. 
Norms also work as signals and symbols, being an important part of social 
roles and cultures. Hence, March and Olsen note a difference between the logic 
of consequences, depending on convenience and purposes, and the logic of 
appropriateness, related to roles, culture and identity.14 From a constructivist 
approach, people adopt social roles and cultures that carry a list of norms: 
‘‘[a]ll the person has to do is interpret the role and act according to its ‘logic of 
appropriateness’’’.15 Of course agents may occupy several roles even at the 
same time and these roles can also be explained as a pattern of expectations. 
But generally speaking, norms signal and define who belongs to a culture. For 
the social constructivist, the point when analyzing norms is not purposes but 
identities.16 For Brennan et al., this approach is useful to explain how norms 
emerge, spread, and even persist, but it is not useful to explain why norms 
emerge. In civil disobedience, groups that try to change the norm usually adopt 
some new roles and adhere to a subculture:17 defenders of marijuana 
legalization are likely to listen to reggae music and have Rastafarian aesthetics, 
while squatters can have defiant punk aesthetics. Roles and cultures may work 
as action schemata and they promote in-group cohesion. On the other hand, 
roles and identities may remain even if the related norms change. 
Different norms suppose different kinds of sanctions. In particular, formal 
norms correspond to formal sanctions, while social norms correspond to social, 
non-formal sanctions (eg. gossip) and moral norms correspond to individual, 
internal sanctions (eg. feeling guilty). To give some examples, smoking 
marijuana usually implies a formal norm violation and its corresponding 
formal sanction, and, depending on the group, it also implies a social non-
 
 14. James G. March & John P. Olsen, The Logic of Appropriateness, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY 689, 703 (Michael Moran et. al. eds., 2006). 
 15. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 160. 
 16. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 8. It must be noted that supporters of the rationalistic 
approach usually argue that the creation of roles, cultures, and the concept of identity itself, find 
their reason in common beneficial outcomes. Carmen Wunderlich, Theoretical Approaches to 
Norm Dynamics, in NORM DYNAMICS IN MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL 20, 21 (Harald Muller 
& Carmen Wunderlich eds., 2013). This is controversial, as some role habits seem to be far from 
beneficial, although role differences usually depend on different interests and benefit views. Id. 
 17. MIKE BRAKE, COMPARATIVE YOUTH CULTURE: THE SOCIOLOGY OF YOUTH CULTURES 
AND YOUTH SUBCULTURES IN AMERICA, BRITAIN AND CANADA, at 1923 (1985). 
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formal sanction. To kill a child generally implies a formal sanction, a social 
non-formal sanction and an internal sanction. 
Norms may have a coordination or a cooperation function, but they cannot 
be defined in these terms. For these authors, we can cooperate and coordinate 
without norms, and norms may also serve other functions, like role creation. 
One may argue that creation of roles and identities is one way of enhancing 
coordination and cooperation, but it is easy to find examples of norms that 
currently do not promote either cooperation or coordination. This discussion is 
quite interesting to explain civil disobedience. When thinking about squatter 
movement and marijuana legalization, their defenders usually argue they 
cannot understand the existence of norms that are not related to coordination or 
cooperation: a marijuana smoker will think he is not harming anyone if he 
smokes at home, he will say that marijuana is not as dangerous as other legal 
substances and its legalization may suppose a better control of drug dealing.18 
Similarly, a squatter will argue that forbidding occupation of empty buildings 
is against cooperation or coordination, and it enhances homelessness.19 In 
short, it seems that some norms that might have been created for mutually 
beneficial outcomes in a specific past context are nowadays having the 
opposite effect. In rationalistic terms, they stopped serving their purposes. As a 
result, new norms that try to serve the purposes in order to get a benefit 
emerge, and fight against the established ones. This generally explains the 
source of civil disobedience. 
If we analyze the distinction between formal, social, and moral norms, we 
find that formal norms have a mediated accountability focused on de re 
normative attitudes, that is, complex external mechanisms of legislation, 
application, and enforcement not known by everybody but dependent on basic 
rules. For Brennan et al., social norms are justified by their practice-
dependency, in the sense that social practices have a justificatory status –the 
social norm is followed because ‘‘it is the way we do things here, in our 
group’’, ‘‘it is the tradition here’’, ‘‘it is our culture’’, while moral norms are 
practice-independent and their accountability is wholly individualistic.20 If we 
consider using the bike in a large city as a way of transport where it is not 
common, we are following an individual practice that, if trendy, may spread 
quickly. If so, we have a community of cyclists that develop a norm –statistical 
regularity behavior – and finally, if it lasts, they become recognized by 
external mechanisms promoting an adequate legislation and the platforms 
needed for an adequate practice of cycling in the city. So the norm begins with 
 
 18. See generally JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT 
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 16–17 (2012). 
 19. Miguel Martínez, El movimiento de okupaciones: una larga e inquietante existencia, 108 
VIENTO SUR 43, 44, 47 (2010) (Spain). 
 20. See generally BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 57–92. 
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an individual or reduced will, it spreads becoming a social popular but non-
regulated habit or custom, and finally, if it lasts, it develops into a formal law. 
These authors call this the process of bootstrapping norms: ‘‘[t]he serious 
social pressure from a sufficient portion of the community is required to 
underwrite each and every primary rule of the system.’’21 This helps to explain 
the spreading and acceptance of the new proposals done by civil disobedience. 
Sometimes the initial moral norm is against the established social and legal 
norms. Thus, social aversion and legal prohibitions towards abortion. We face 
a confrontation between the new moral norm and the previous social and legal 
norms. However, it may be the case that this initially moral habit spreads and 
becomes a social norm of a particular group, leading to a conflict between 
different social norms, assumed by different groups. If the new social norm is 
generally assumed, it may evolve into a formal norm. In the particular case of 
abortion, we are living just this kind of process: it has been legalized in several 
countries during the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries, and society and 
governments of these places are dealing with the conflicts, that began with acts 
of civil disobedience.22 In short, when evolving from a moral attitude to a 
formal norm, social attitude generalization and legal system reformulation may 
start from civil disobedience coming from individuals or particular groups, and 
this usually means conflict. But ‘‘[I]f social norms involving actions connected 
with our core interests are rare, we suggest this may be because many of us 
already accept some kind of moral limits on the justificatory power of social 
practices.’’23 
In civil disobedience, and generally in processes of changing of norms, we 
can elucidate that the new behavior against the old norm starts from individual 
moral attitudes. For our authors, there is no mechanism governing morality. 
Later, we have the bootstrapping processes. 
2.1. Norm emergence 
Four basic categories explain norm emergence processes: two-step 
processes, free-flowing cascades, follow-the-leader norm imposition and 
adoption, and norms from conventions.24 
 
 21. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 94. 
 22. See generally Iñaki Lete et al., Is There a Need for a New Abortion Law in Spain?, 19 
THE EUR. J. OF CONTRACEPTION AND REPROD. HEALTH CARE 75, 76 (2014) (explaining that 
social movements have taken place to protest the Spainish government returning to the old norm). 
This kind of reaction may be analyzed as norm change processes too. See generally MERIKE 
BLOFIELD, THE POLITICS OF MORAL SIN: ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN SPAIN, CHILE AND 
ARGENTINA (2006). 
 23. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 87. 
 24. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 95–102. 
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Two-step processes involve an initial informal commitment becoming 
more formal and punishable. Brennan et al. give as examples political 
decisions and international laws that start from simple protocols or abstract 
agreements and after a time become accepted and sanctionable rules.25 
Thinking about multiculturalism and multilingualism policies in Europe, in 
1992 the Council of Europe promoted the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages (ECRML) as a protocol to protect minority languages in 
Europe.26 That supposed the development of more specific laws by States and 
local governments all over Europe. For instance, the Aragonese Government 
has passed laws to protect the Aragonese language in 2009 and 2013.27 
Although the two-step norm emergence processes are not useful to analyze 
civil disobedience, they may serve as a way of steering the process of norm 
change. By contrast, they take a long time, and normally groups cannot afford 
the delays. 
Free-flowing cascades show that people with little to lose will adopt easily 
transgression conducts, and while they become more, other people with 
slightly higher threshold will support them, and so on. This is what typically 
happens in riots: at the beginning, only people in an extreme situation use 
violence, but as other non-wealthy individuals join, the violent group becomes 
bigger and more people may support, and even participate in, riots. We have 
seen this in demonstrations and occupy-movements in countries all over the 
world. In May 2011, thousands of people following the Arab Spring 
Movements camped in Puerta del Sol square in Madrid.28 This action was 
punishable, yet during that week more and more people followed and remained 
to protest in squares all over Spain.29 Following on the heels of the riots in 
Gamonal, Burgos in January 2014 and exacerbated by Spain’s economic 
climate, violent riots have increased in popularity in places like Madrid in 
March 2014 and in Barcelona in May 2014.30 They can be analyzed as free-
flowing cascade processes too. If free-flowing cascades triumph, the first 
objectors usually benefit the most. It must be noted that free-flowing cascades 
 
 25. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 95–97. 
 26. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 (7th ed. 2014). 
 27. Jacobo Compains Clemente, La Regulación del Pluralismo Lingüístico en Aragón 54, 
76–77 (Feb. 2014) (unpublished Masters thesis, Universidad Pública de Navarra), http://academ 
icae.unavarra.es/bitstream/handle/2454/9665/Jacobo%20Compains.pdf?sequence=1&isAllow 
ed=y. 
 28. Ernesto Castañeda, The Indignados of Spain: A Precedent to Occupy Wall Street, 11 
SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 309, 310 (2012). 
 29. Jeffrey S. Juris, Reflections on #Occupy Everywhere: Social Media, Public Space, and 
Emerging Logics of Aggregation, 39 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 259, 261 (2012). 
 30. Stephen Burgen, Thirty Arrested as Rioting Continues at Can Vies Building in 
Barcelona, THE GUARDIAN (May 29, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/29/ 
can-vies-barcelona-rioting-thirty-arrested. 
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can also be informational cascades, because of their similar development. 
Social networks hold many examples of informational cascades.31 
Follow-the-leader norm imposition and adoption happens when a powerful 
person or minority decides to follow a specific norm.32 Little-by-little, this 
norm spreads among the upper-classes, and finally, among lower-classes.. 
Imposition may occur, but it is not always necessary – at least explicitly. Basil 
Bernstein studies this imposition in Class, Codes and Control with reference to 
languages.33 Norbert Elias shows something similar applied to medieval and 
early modern Europe in The Civilizing Process.34 When analyzing endangered 
cultures, the case of the Aragonese language is paradigmatic: it was the main 
language in the Aragonese Kingdom during the Middle Ages, but the arrival of 
the Castilian Dynasty caused the language of the new king, Castilian, to work 
its way through society until it became the main language.35 Today, the 
Aragonese language is spoken by few people, generally herders who live in the 
Pyrenees.36 It must be noted that being a leader does not necessarily imply 
political or institutional power, but just power. For instance, if a particular 
marijuana smoker is popular within his or her group of non-smoker friends, 
this activity is likely to spread.37 
Norms from conventions arise when initial behavioral regularities that 
serve a coordination function and apply mechanically become accountable and 
imply a social or formal sanctioning system. A typical example is traffic rules: 
at the beginning they were just conventions to allow for coordination between 
pedestrians and newborn cars.38 Repetition supposes common expectations and 
finally norm establishment. At the beginning, failing to follow the convention 
was not punished. City cycling policies are in the middle of the transformation 
from information convention to formal norm. As bikes become more popular 
means of transport in some countries, conventions spread, and finally some 
new social and formal norms emerge. However, depending on pedestrians, 
 
 31. Kristina Lerman & Rumi Ghosh, Information Contagion: An Empirical Study of the 
Spread of News on Digg and Twitter Social Networks, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEBLOGS AND SOCIAL MEDIA (2010). 
 32. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 100–01. 
 33. Basil Bernstein & David Henderson, Social Class Differences in the Relevance of 
Language to Socialization, in 2 CLASS, CODES AND CONTROL: APPLIED STUDIES TOWARDS A 
SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 13, 24 (2003). 
 34. See NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS 48–67 (Edmund Jephcott trans., 1994) 
(discussing the history of table manners in Europe). 
 35. Francho Nagore Lain, The Development of the Aragonese Language During the 
Twentieth Century and its Present Sociolinguistic Standing, in LANGUAGE: COMPETENCE, 
CHANGE, CONTACT 193, 193–94 (Annikki Koskensalo et al., eds., 2012). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 18, at 122–24. 
 38. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 111–12. 
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cyclists and automobile users and industry’s interests, these conventions and 
norms are not free from controversy as they challenge the established ones.39 
2.2. Norm persistence 
Thinking about the sources of norm persistence once they emerge, 
Brennan et al. talk about change costs, change interests, self-fulfilling 
expectations, and sinkholes.40 Thus, norms may persist due to transition costs 
or an interest in previous norms persisting. Thinking about cycling policies, the 
change of traffic rules and the adoption of appropriate infrastructures for 
cycling, though expensive, may imply the onset of new traffic rules. These 
transition costs are part of the argument used by people who are against 
implementing cycling as a way of transport in large cities. Moreover, people 
who are used to using the car as the main way of transport are more interested 
in established rules persisting.41 
Common expectations serve as a tool for norm persistence too: people 
expect me to follow the established norm and I expect them to do the same. 
Expectations allow us to coordinate; they create a bridge between present and 
future, introducing stability into social life, while making it difficult to change 
existing norms. Thinking about squatter movements, agents are generally 
expected not to occupy others’ property and they generally expect the same all 
other agents. Hence it is frowned on to break the rule. Squatters groups must 
break the expectation in order to spread their new norm.42 As we will see, 
Bicchieri’s account of norms is based on expectations and not on 
accountability.43 A related phenomenon is pluralistic ignorance, in which 
people follow a norm and assume it to be accepted when it is particularly 
rejected by the majority.44 In other terms, it occurs when people generally have 
a false expectation. Many teenagers believe they must drink alcohol to be 
accepted within their peer group, and they expect their peers to drink as well, 
although it may be the case that most of them do not like alcohol. 
Finally, the authors talk about sink holes – absorbing Markov chains – to 
explain that some norms are absorbing, and once you fall into them, it is very 
hard to get out.45 For instance, it is very difficult to stop using some electronic 
devices once you have begun. This last mechanism of norm persisting is not 
really interesting for a discussion of civil disobedience; they presuppose 
 
 39. See John Pucher & Ralph Buehler, Cycling For a Few or For Everyone: The Importance 
of Social Justice in Cycling Policy, 15 WORLD TRANSPORT POL’Y & PRAC. 57, 60–62 (2009). 
 40. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 102–07. 
 41. Pucher & Buehler, supra note 39, at 62–63. 
 42. Martínez, supra note 19, at 44, 47. 
 43. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 2–4. 
 44. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 106. 
 45. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 107. 
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general acceptance in terms of common purposes or benefits –coordination and 
not cooperation attitudes – and thus they are not controversial. 
2.3. Norm change 
Brennan et al. state that norms can change both in content and in status.46 
Changes in content are difficult to carry out without mechanisms of norm 
creation and application, because of sanctions that norm violators suffer. What 
the authors propose as a catalyst to change the content of norms are status 
hierarchies that enable some people to violate the previous norms and establish 
new ones. In other words, change in content demands a follow-the-leader 
process. The leaders can have different powers: institutional, media, popular, 
and so on. For example, some statements made by powerful and famous people 
like Barack Obama47 and Usain Bolt48 may help the marijuana legalization 
processes. Sometimes, new behaviors are interpreted, and reinterpreted, to fix 
into an existing norm. It must be noted that it is usually easier to modify a 
given norm that to create a completely new one. Hence, Brennan et al. explain 
that while marriage was a ‘‘[b]usiness affair for uniting property and producing 
children,’’49 homosexual relationships did not make any sense, but when 
marriage became a question of love, they did, and as a result, homosexual 
couples are being formally recognized. 
Thinking about change in status, non-formal norms can derive into formal 
norms because several causes: the group has become too big; there are 
disagreements about norm interpretation; people want to warrant a formal 
sanction assuring an effective application of the norm; and the formalization of 
the norm may suppose an easier epistemic access to it. Thinking about cycling 
policies, as cyclists’ numbers are increasing, in some cities we may find 
disagreements about norm and convention interpretations, or we may find it 
difficult to access conventions, so formal norms and sanctions are required.50 
On the other hand, formal norms may evolve into non-formal norms as 
well. Thinking about languages, language-planning institutions like Real 
Academia Española51 create and spread norms quickly, thus are assumed to be 
 
 46. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 107–08. 
 47. Jon Swaine, Barach Obama Says Smoking Marijuana Less Dangerous Than Drinking 
Alcohol, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ba 
rackobama/10582947/Barack-Obama-says-smoking-marijuana-less-dangerous-than-drinking-al 
cohol.html. 
 48. Usain Bolt: I Smoked Marijuana, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (Apr. 12, 2009), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/athletics/5146085/Usain-Bolt-I-smoked-marijua 
na.html. 
 49. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 110. 
 50. Pucher & Buehler, supra note 39, at 61. 
 51. José del Valle & Laura Villa, La disputada autoridad de las academias: Debate 
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social norms. Hence, Spanish spelling norms have changed several times 
during the last decades.52 Folk words and idioms have also been recognized by 
this institution, offering an example of moral and social norms becoming 
formal ones.53 Both processes are quite similar and can be analyzed as follow-
the-leader examples: one or few people create and spread a norm because of 
their power. The difference is just the kind of power they have: in the case of 
formal institutions power is political or institutional, while in the case of folk 
behavior power is popular. For example, artists also have media power and 
they can spread fashions. 
Similar to formal and non-formal norms, moral individual norms can 
evolve into social norms and social norms can evolve into moral norms. Some 
agents may feel that pregnant women must be free to decide about abortion and 
they can convince or get in touch with other people to create a group with the 
same social norm. Similarly, this group can disseminate information and 
convince other people, who then also adopt this social norm as a moral norm.54 
With regard to civil disobedience, typically non-formal norms fight against 
the established formal norms and, if successful, change them. Few people act 
as leaders in a broad sense, to try and change the established norm, seeking 
more justice or benefits. If more and more people follow this new social norm, 
it will become a formal norm. 
2.4. Norms unraveling and breaching 
Norm change starts with the will of one or few agents who adopt a new 
attitude or behavior that spreads due to social or practical reasons (sections 2.1 
& 2.3). Norm change is likely to find difficulties, as we have seen in section 
2.2, but it also presents some plus points. 
Brennan et al. show that while the number of norm violators is increasing, 
the probability of being sanctioned, the number of sanctioners, the number of 
penalties, the severity of sanctions, and the disesteem against violators 
decrease.55 Furthermore, others’ behaviors affect our own expectations and 
attitudes, especially in ambiguous norms. It is important to point out that all 
these factors depend on the perception of compliance, not on actual 
compliance: ‘‘[W]e have given the impression that it is actual compliance 
levels that matter. This is of course not right: it is the perception of compliance 
 
LINGÜÍSTICA IBEROAMERICANA 29, 30 (2012) (Ger.). This institution focuses on the Spanish 
language. 
 52. Id. at 30–49. 
 53. Id. at 31. 
 54. Alison Norris et al., Abortion Stigma: A Reconceptualization of Constituents, Causes, 
and Consequences, 21 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES S49, S49–53 (2011). 
 55. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 114–18. 
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levels that influences people’s behavior.’’56 Thinking about smoking 
marijuana, while this drug is becoming more and more popular, that is, while 
the number of smokers is increasing, the probability of being sanctioned is 
lower, probably the number and severity of fines too, and the disesteem against 
smokers decreases as well.57 
The schemata Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikking propose 
for some norm change refusal consist of five steps: repression, denial, tactical 
concessions, prescriptive status and finally rule-consistent behavior.58 
Applying it to the Aragonese endangered language, its use was cruelly 
repressed during the François Spain; then, rights were denied during the first 
years of democracy; later, some tactical concessions were given in the form of 
some literary prices, and in recent years (2009, 2013) some specific laws to 
protect and promote this language have been passed by the regional 
government.59 
Brennan et al. describe several forms of norm breaching.60 People can just 
ignore the norm, acting as they would have done had the norm not existed. 
Also, people can calculate the difference between paying penalties or acting in 
accordance with the law, and decide what is better. For instance, take urban 
cyclists that act as if there were no specific regulations for bikes in cities. 
Imagine fines for cycling on pedestrian sidewalks are cheap: a lot of cyclists 
would use them. If it is too costly to comply with a norm, it will not be 
complied with. People may also pretend to comply disguising non-compliance. 
Marijuana smokers, especially young ones without their parents’ permission, 
usually do not manifest that they smoke marijuana because of the possible 
stigmatization or punishment. Another way of breaching a norm is to find a 
particular context that exempts from the application of this norm or the 
punishments related. Thus, some marijuana smokers go to specific private 
(some clubs) or discrete public places (like lonely parks) to smoke. 
The two most interesting ways of breaching a norm given by Brennan et al. 
are conscientious objection61 and civil disobedience.62 They imply violating a 
norm to undermine it and breaching this unwanted norm conscientiously. The 
objector wants to make public this norm violation, making a difference with 
common non-compliers: the rest of people must know that there is some 
conscientious objection. For instance, in 2013 supporters of Occitan language 
 
 56. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 117. 
 57. See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 18, at 42–52. 
 58. Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights 
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 22–31 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 2000). 
 59. See Compains Clemente, supra note 27, at 8–21. 
 60. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 234–44. 
 61. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 234–44. 
 62. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 234–44. 
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in Toulouse entered the new tram shouting the street names in Occitan 
language when the train announced them in French.63 Recently some people 
refuse to pay metro in Spain as a way of protesting against public policies.64 In 
this case, they risk of being seen as just common non-compliers or free riders 
who only want to travel for free, and they have to make public both their norm 
violation and its motives.65 
It must be noted that in the case of norms followed because of false 
expectations without a general desire to comply –pluralistic ignorance, see 
sections 2.2 & 3.2, once the real general feelings are discovered, false 
expectations and related norms quickly disappear. 
2.5. Bad norms 
We are used to considering some established norms as bad norms. Some of 
them refer to cliché and stereotypes, others to controversial laws and habits, 
and so on. Civil disobedience was born out of the will to change these norms, 
even though they may not be bad for everybody. 
Speaking to the emergence of bad norms, Brennan et al. show that people 
may adopt bad norms because they are mistaken either about the facts or about 
others’ intentions.66 Norms can also have multiple, good and bad, effects. Thus 
it may be difficult to evaluate the final outcome. Other norms may have been 
good in the past but not in the present, as circumstances have changed. 
Mistakes about facts or others intentions do not suppose a big problem in the 
long run, because once the agents realize the mistake, the norm quickly 
disappears. Problems arise with multiple effects, especially when some people 
focus on bad effects and others just on good. Thinking about squatter 
movements, their supporters usually focus on bad consequences of private 
property and capitalism –as having both empty buildings and homeless people 
– while critics towards them focus on good consequences of capitalism.67 We 
 
 63. See Ben Lerwill, Toulouse: Occitan, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC TRAVELLER (U.K.) (Jan. 
15, 2013), http://www.natgeotraveller.co.uk/destinations/europe/france/toulouse-occitan/ 
(describing the tradition in Toulouse that the tram would announce street names in both French 
and Occitan); Speakers of France’s Endangered Languages Demand Recognition, THE 
OBSERVERS (Fr.) (Apr. 4, 2012), http://observers.france24.com/en/20120404-speakers-france-
endangered-languages-protest-recognition-local-regional-minority-presidential-election; 
Thousands March for Regional Langue Do’c in Toulouse, RFI (Fr.) (Mar. 31, 2012), 
http://www.english.rfi.fr/culture/20120331-thousands-march-regional-langue-doc-toulouse. 
 64. Spanish Commuters say ‘I’m not paying’ to Fare Hikes, THE OBSERVERS (Jan. 19, 
2012), http://observers.france24.com/en/20120119-spain-commuters-say-yo-no-pago-not-paying-
fare-hikes-public-transport-debt-crisis. 
 65. Id. 
 66. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 177–78; see also discussion of Norm Persistence 
supra Part 2.2; see also discussion of Pluralistic Ignorance infra Part 3.2. 
 67. See Martínez, supra note 19, at 43–48. 
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also find problems when contexts change. Some people want to adapt or 
change the existing norm, while others prefer to maintain previous 
circumstances. For example, most current regulations and orders about traffic 
are made considering two kinds of agents: pedestrians and motor vehicle 
drivers. Nevertheless, cycling is becoming more popular as an urban way of 
transport, and in some countries the established rules are not efficient, for 
cyclists, pedestrians, nor motor vehicle drivers. Facing this new situation, some 
people want to adapt and create new rules and infrastructures while others 
prefer to limit bike use and come back to the previous context.68 
Bad norms persist in almost the same way as norms in general do.69 People 
may internalize norms without any deep reflection. On the other hand, it can be 
difficult to organize a collective action to change the established norm, and 
sometimes it is necessary to take one step back in order to move two steps 
forward. It can be thought that bad norms are not so bad when compared to 
other historical norms, and that it is better to follow the old norm rather than 
joining into an anarchic state. If we recall the squatter movement context and 
their criticisms against capitalism, we may find that capitalism itself still 
presents some broad problems. But many people have internalized this system 
and it is difficult to implement an alternative.70 To make a new system is a 
difficult task; we can always praise capitalism as compared to previous 
systems like feudalism. Furthermore, changing such a deep norm may put us 
into an anarchic state. All these mechanisms, usually based on the fear of 
change and the absence of deliberation, act as old norm protectors. Pluralistic 
Ignorance (see sections 2.2 & 3.2) may help such norm persistence. 
Furthermore, it is likely to be accompanied by norms of anti-criticism in 
respect of these bad norms: squatters usually are not viewed well, most of their 
activities are penalized, and there may be moralistic aggression for those who 
fail to sanction them.71 
2.6. Norm following vs. Norm conforming 
Following a norm implies norm internalization, which is, to act in 
accordance with the norm, treating it as a non-instrumental reason. The person 
who follows the norm acts because of the norm, making it extremely difficult 
to change her mind. On the other hand, conforming with norms implies norm 
externalization, that is, to act in accordance with the norm because of external 
considerations –usually instrumental reasons. 
 
 68. See Pucher & Buehler, supra note 39, at 59–61. 
 69. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 179–83. 
 70. Martínez, supra note 19, at 43–48. 
 71. Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation (or 
Anything Else) in Sizable Groups, 13 ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 171, 183 (1992). 
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Following a norm supposes a conative account rather than a cognitive 
account. In a cognitive account, individuals have cognitive states involving the 
norm, such as beliefs or perceptions.72 In a conative account, desires, 
preferences, and emotions in general, explain agent behavior.73 As far as 
following a norm supposes norm internalization and treating rules in a non-
instrumental manner, emotional and conative features are key. That is why 
followed and internalized norms are more rigid and difficult to change. If we 
take the previous distinction between moral, social, and formal norms, we find 
that formal norms, as they depend on de dicto external normative attitudes and 
powers, are conformed. Social norms, as they are compiled with internally, are 
the archetype of followed norms. 
Conforming with norms implies acting according to the norm because of 
external reasons, usually instrumental ones like sanctions: tangible sanctions 
(legal, economic, or political sanctions), folk sanctions (gossiping, ostracism), 
or intangible sanctions (remorse). Of course, people may decide to violate the 
norm if potential benefits are higher than sanction severity. Furthermore, 
sanctioning is usually costly. Other factors, like being observed during norm 
breaching, audience size and quality, reputation, and formal design come into 
play. For Brennan et al., if following a norm was socially common, 
conforming with formal norms is proper.74 Moral norms are more problematic, 
as we can think that we obey them for internal idealist reasons or because they 
suppose some kind of profit. However, conforming with a norm is not 
incompatible with following that norm, as far as the same norm can be a 
formal, social, and moral norm. 
Transferring this analysis to civil disobedience, norm change is harder 
when the old established norm is followed generally than when it is just 
conformed to, as the norm is internally obeyed and final motivations are 
emotional. Changes in conformed norms only have to deal with sanctions. For 
instance, being against abortion used to be an internalized norm among 
Spanish society.75 Actually, some people follow this idea. They justify their 
stance on abortion not on external reasons but just on the norm itself and it is 
extremely difficult for them to change their minds. On the other hand, people 
who adopt the same norm in terms of conformity can change their opinion 
easily; when sanctions become softer, abortion gets more popular and they 
focus on the benefits it may suppose.76 
 
 72. See generally BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 195–217 (discussing norm following). 
 73. See generally BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 195–217. 
 74. See generally BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 213–33 (explaining norm conforming). 
 75. See generally BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 213–33. 
 76. See generally BLOFIELD, supra note 22, at 88–94; Norris et al., supra note 54, at S49–54; 
Lete et al., supra note 22, at 75–77. 
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3.  NORMS IN BICCHIERI’S THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY (BICCHIERI, 2006) 
The Grammar of Society77 offers an agentialist but reductive view of 
norms, while Explaining Norms78 provided an agentialist and non-reductive 
definition.79 Bicchieri defines norms in terms of agents’ expectations and the 
conditional preferences depending of those expectations: ‘‘[c]ollective 
phenomena are ultimately the outcome of a myriad of individual decisions.’’80 
Groups are only instruments for norm deployment, while the causes are 
expectations and the purposes are coordination and cooperation among people. 
The concept of expectation is intrinsically linked to the statistical definition of 
norm, supposing not a general behavior but a general belief. Communication is 
essential for expectations, norms, and identity generation. In Bicchieri’s 
analysis, context is indispensable for norm activation. Thus, both situational 
and dispositional components are mandatory. She distinguishes between social 
norms, descriptive norms, and conventions. 
The definition of social norm given in The Grammar of Society is: 
Let R be a behavioral rule for situations of type S, where S can be represented 
as a mixed-motive game. We say that R is a social norm in a population P if 
there exists a sufficiently large subset Pcf ⊆ P such that, for each individual i ∈ 
Pcf : 
 Contingency: i knows that a rule R exists and applies to situations of type 
S; 
 Conditional preference: i prefers to conform to R in situations of type S on 
the condition that: 
 (a) Empirical expectation: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P 
conforms to R in situations of type S; 
and either 
 (b) Normative expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P 
expects i to conform R in situations of type S; 
or 
 (b) Normative expectations with sanctions: i believes that a sufficiently 
large subset of P expects i to conform to R in situations of type S, prefers i to 
conform, and may sanction behavior. 
A social norm R is followed by population P if there exists a sufficiently large 
subset Pf⊆ Pcf such that, for each individual i ∈ Pf, conditions 2(a) and either 
 
 77. See generally BICCHIERI, supra note 2. 
 78. See generally BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1. 
 79. See generally BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 2; BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 260. 
Nevertheless, we may argue that their definition of norm is based on accountability. 
 80. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 56. 
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2(b) or 2(b’) are met for i and, as a result, i prefers to conform to R in 
situations of type S.81 
It must be noted that the norm classification proposed by Bicchieri is 
different from that posited by Brennan et al.82 Nevertheless, Bicchieri touches 
on formal and moral norms briefly just to show that the previous definition 
based on expectations applies only to social norms.83 
Social norms based on expectations suppose regularity –about beliefs, not 
necessarily about norm compliance. They usually work as solution to 
cooperation problems, promoting equilibrium, while descriptive norms and 
conventions serve as solutions to coordination problems .84 If we think about 
the traditional anti-abortion social norm, we find that due to historical, 
political, or religious circumstances, most of the population (Pcf) knew the anti-
abortion rule (contingency condition) and agents preferred to conform to it if 
they noticed that a large part of people conformed to it (empirical expectation) 
and if they perceived that a large part of people expected them to comply 
(normative expectation). Although in this case there was a sanction if the agent 
violated the norm (condition 2(b’)), accountability and norm following (Pf) are 
not necessary to have social norms, but just a regularity in norm expectation 
(conditions 2(a) and 2(b)). The norm can be breached if people do not know of 
it or if they decide not to conform to it, breaking the system of common 
expectations. The latter is the case of civil disobedience. Thus, in the abortion 
case, pregnant women who decide to abort –clandestinely or abroad – break 
the common expectation. If this behavior spreads, regularities about rule 
expectation (Pcf) and rule following (Pf) disappear, and so the norm. It must be 
noted that social norms may be ambiguous; furthermore, several norms may 
apply to the same situation. In a lot of cases situational and contextual 
variables may change agents and behaviors. In our example, life risk for the 
pregnant woman may induce an anti-abortion supporter to allow for abortion.85 
On the contrary, moral norms are not based on expectations but on 
unconditional commitments. The reasons to comply with the former reside in 
both agents and the norm itself, and not on common expectations. Although 
Bicchieri does not focus on these, if a moral norm spreads, it may generate 
common expectations and become a social norm.86 Also, Bicchieri states that 
 
 81. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 11. 
 82. See generally BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 260. 
 83. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 8. 
 84. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 2–3. Coordination deals with aligned individual interests and 
cooperation treats opposed interests. See id. 
 85. See generally BLOFIELD, supra note 22, at 4; Norris et al., supra note 51, at S49–54; 
Lete et al., supra note 22, at 75–77. 
 86. See generally BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 8. 
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people are more likely to punish social or descriptive norm violations rather 
than their own moral norm violations.87 
Bicchieri gives the formal definition of descriptive norm as: 
Let R be a behavioral rule for situations of type S, where S is a coordination 
game. We say that R is a descriptive norm in a population P if there exists a 
sufficiently large subset Pcf ⊆ P such that, for each individual i ∈ Pcf : 
 1. Contingency: i knows that a rule R exists and applies to situations of 
type S; 
 2. Conditional preference: i prefers to conform to R in situations of type S 
on the condition that: 
 (a) Empirical expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P 
conforms to R in situations of type S. 
A descriptive norm is followed by population P if there exists a sufficiently 
large subset Pf⊆ Pcf such that, for all i ∈ Pf, Conditions 2(a) is met for i and as 
a result i prefers to conform R in situations of type S.88 
Descriptive norms apply to coordination, and not mixed-motive games. 
The reasons to conform with descriptive norms are not others’ expectations –
normative expectations disappear – or the necessity to solve conflicts between 
selfish and pro-social interests, but solving preexisting coordination problems. 
Informational influence replaces normative influence. However, a descriptive 
norm is an equilibrium: ‘‘[I]f one believes R to be widely followed, then it is in 
one’s interest to follow R, too.’’89 Descriptive norms usually make life better 
for the group, and for ourselves. The archetypal example of descriptive norm is 
fashion: life is easier if we fit into the mainstream, although there is no 
obligation or any expectation to follow the norm. 
This definition of descriptive norm does not fit into the general definition 
of norm given by Brennan et al., based on accountability.90 Actually, Bicchieri 
states that ‘‘[c]onformity to a descriptive norm need not involve an obligation 
or normative expectation: We do not feel any group pressure to conform (…) 
Deviation from the ‘norm’ is not punished.’’91 Nevertheless, I believe that 
 
 87. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 139, 151 (‘‘In the absence of external sanctions of any kind 
only a personal system of values would have sufficient motivational power to induce subjects to 
cooperate.”). I strongly disagree with Bicchieri here. A system of values activated in the absence 
of expectations and sanctions is not enough. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 87 (‘‘Many of us 
already accept some kind of moral limits on the justificatory power of social practices [and 
expectations].”) (explaining a key point of civil disobedience). 
 88. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 31–32. 
 89. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 32. 
 90. See generally BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 36–37. 
 91. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 30. 
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Brennan et al. would argue that positive results of complying with a descriptive 
norm involve some kind of accountability.92 
Descriptive norms are vulnerable if agents get a benefit for breaching them 
and good descriptive norms usually imply this kind of situation. As a result, 
they are more vulnerable than bad descriptive norms. 
Descriptive norms, as they do not concern obligations or others’ 
expectations, may not be interesting in terms of norm change and civil 
disobedience processes. But, as far as they may serve as an instrument to 
perpetuate the mainstream, it is interesting to analyze the example of fashions 
and other descriptive norms among groups who want to change the established 
rules. So far, defenders of marijuana legalization are usually recognized for 
their own aesthetics based on Rastafari subculture and reggae music, while 
squatters usually follow punk fads.93 Two goals emerge from the promotion of 
fashion: to escape from the mainstream fashion usually related to the 
established norms and to create their own descriptive norm that gives internal 
cohesion and may help to spread the alternative norm. 
Finally, the formal definition of conventions is: 
A descriptive norm is a convention if there exists a sufficiently large subset Pf 
⊆ P such that, for each individual i ∈ Pf , the following conditions hold: 
 1. Empirical expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P 
conforms to R in situations of type S and 
 2. S is a coordination game without nonstrict Nash equilibria [it is a 
player’s interest to stick it]. 
 Recall that, for a descriptive norm to be followed, empirical expectations 
[Condition 2(a)] had to be met. Hence, a convention is always a followed 
descriptive norm, because empirical expectations are met. That is, the follower 
of a convention always expects a sufficiently large subset of P to conform94 
Both conventions and social norms imply empirical expectations, but 
conventions are usually followed without problems while social norms may 
not.95 Conventions revolve around original automatic coordination games in 
which agents’ selfish motives are not confronted, while social norms respond 
to cooperation problems in which agents’ interests are involved. In short, social 
norms are not as stable as conventions. Deep-rooted social norms usually 
crystallize into conventions. On the other hand, breaking conventions that 
produce negative externalities may, in turn, turn them into social norms. Also, 
conventions are usually arbitrary. Thinking about traffic, cars in cities 
supposed the creation of social norms that became conventions decades later. 
 
 92. See BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 36–37. 
 93. BRAKE, supra note 17, at 76–80, 133–39. 
 94. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 38. 
 95. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 95. 
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Bikes as a new urban way of transport have lapsed these conventions,96 turning 
them into discussed social norms and creating new controversial social norms 
that, after a time, are likely to crystallize as new conventions. 
It is difficult to set the boundaries between social norms, descriptive norms 
and conventions when analyzing a particular norm. Conventions are usually 
performed automatically –without leaving out rationality – while social norms 
imply a conscious interpretation. Social norms may come from descriptive 
norms or from pro-social norms (cooperation, reciprocity, fairness...). On the 
other hand, conscientious objectors form new groups generating internal 
expectations that evolve into norms followed by the in-group members. Not 
only do they support these new norms but they also promote and try to spread 
them. It is important to remark that expectations need not be universal, just 
general in order to follow a norm. 
3.1. Categories, schemata, cues, scripts, groups and culture 
Bicchieri defines norms in terms of expectations, and ultimately, in terms 
of preferences and beliefs.97 More specifically, she analyzes norm-activation 
processes in terms of cues, scripts, and schemata.98 This modular 
conceptualization starts from context –external inputs – and continues with 
attention and interpretation of cues stored because of previous experiences. 
Then the particular situation is categorized in terms of these cues and as a 
result scripts are activated. Later, beliefs and preferences are activated by 
mixing dispositional attitudes with the initial situational or contextual 
elements. Finally, the norm is turned on informing the agent about the system 
of expectations. In this process, both context and information previously stored 
are decisive: what is called semantic priming increases the speed and accuracy 
of decisions. 
In other words, there is a general process of categorization when a schema 
or script is activated. This process starts with channeling attention to specific 
stimuli and ends with actions. It should be noted that when categorizing, we 
must focus on ideal cues or prototypes –especially when we do not know a lot 
about the stimuli –or just on a set of empirical examples previously 
experimented –when we have enough and they represent flexibility and 
variability. Categorization depends on background knowledge, particular 
decision context, and final goals. For instance, an anti-abortionist gets the case 
of a pregnant woman as an input, and quickly he gets a cue depending on 
previous cases. Then anti-abortion scripts are activated and thus his anti-
abortion beliefs and preferences. Finally, the anti-abortionist norm and its 
expectations system are turned on and promoted. If a pregnant woman’s life is 
 
 96. Pucher & Buehler, supra note 39, at 59, 60. 
 97. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 2. 
 98. See BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 81–82. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
344 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV:323 
in danger, the cues may be different: the anti-abortionist may know about death 
or injured pregnant women or he may not have any previous experience and 
need to create a rudimentary theory about it, drawing inferences, making 
predictions, and interpreting. The former case is likely to activate a pro-
abortion script, its corresponding beliefs and preferences and ultimately the 
abortionist norm. The latter case is ambiguous and both pro-abortion and anti-
abortion scripts, beliefs, preferences, and norms may be activated. 
Cultures make easier coordination and cooperation among their members, 
as they conceive certain stored norms as fundamental: ‘‘[I]n-group favoritism 
is based on the expectations that favors made to in-group members are more 
likely to be reciprocated that favors made to out-group members.’’99 Group-
specific norms maximize differences between the group and outsiders, and 
minimize differences among its members. Nevertheless, Bicchieri states that 
similarity is more a consequence than a cause of group formation.100 If we 
apply it to our civil disobedience cases, it is not that similarity between 
pregnant pro-abortion women, marijuana legalization supporters, urban 
cyclists, or squatters create their culture and as a result from a group. Instead, 
they have a common goal –this may be the only initial similarity – they create 
a group and finally they develop some common roles and expectations. 
Actually group behavior and group membership can exist without any social 
context, structure, or any interdependence between members: the only thing 
needed for group formation is ‘‘[t]he recognition and acceptance of some self-
defining social categorization.’’101 Generally, perceived similarities and 
discussions maintain and create group identity. But specific commitments, 
promise-keeping norms, and particularly discussions, are more likely to induce 
cooperation than previous group identity. 
The differences between natural and human beliefs must be pointed out. 
While the first are independent –at least to a certain extent – of human beliefs 
and behaviors discovered from a host of inductive inferences (eg. birds, apes), 
the latter are made by men having a limited inductive potential (eg. social 
classes, nationalities). People tend to consider social categories as natural kinds 
with their high inductive potential and stability: this usually happens in 
stereotyping. Considering the cases of civil disobedience, all the established 
rules are human kinds that are usually treated as natural –and even universal – 
by compliers, in some kind of naturalistic fallacy:102 abortion, cycling, 
 
 99. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 154 n.13. 
 100. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 155–56 
 101. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 159. 
 102. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 96 (‘‘[W]e are, in other words, subject to a naturalistic 
fallacy in most of our daily dealings. The projectible regularity, when human interactions are 
involved, comes to be perceived as a right or a duty.”) (explaining that by considering human 
rules as natural we can promote and perpetuate the established rules in their own terms). 
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promoting endangered languages, and squatter movements seem unnatural for 
traditional norms followers. Nowadays there is a great controversy in Spain 
about the Constitution,103 as it is commonly used as the final argument against 
major political and social change proposals, working as a natural universal 
kind. 
3.2. Norm formation and pluralistic ignorance 
Bicchieri explains norm formation in terms of expectations, in order to 
reach the best possible result when facing a new situation.104 People search for 
an existing behavioral rule that can apply to the new situation and form beliefs 
in order to coordinate. The information already stored in scripts and is turned 
on by cues of situations that resemble the new one. 
Bicchieri pays special attention to the pluralistic ignorance phenomena 
(sections 2.2 & 3.2) in which people misperceive their social environment, 
develop false expectations, underestimate the similarity between their beliefs 
and their peers’, and finally state a norm that nobody wants.105 For instance, a 
group of friends wants to go to the cinema and everybody expects that the rest 
want to watch a particular film, while in reality, nobody really wants to watch 
that film, and finally all of them watch that unwanted film. For Bicchieri, the 
reason of pluralistic ignorance is a self/other difference.106 Thus, due to 
embarrassment or the desire to fit in, there is a tendency to think the behavior 
of others in terms of their internal causes (beliefs, preferences) and our own 
behaviors in terms of external causes (social pressure). Thinking about 
abortion –at least in Spain some decades ago – there was a false expectation in 
some people: they thought the rest of the group were against abortion, while a 
great part of them were not, but at the beginning nobody spoke out due to 
expected social pressure. These cases were more acute when pregnant women 
decided to abort, and were forced to keep it secret.107 
It must be noted that pluralistic ignorance norms, although privately 
unpopular, suppose equilibria. Furthermore, they may in time be internalized 
by people who followed them against their will, ‘‘[s]o that fake loyalty may 
become true loyalty.’’108 On the other hand, as far as these norms are based on 
initially false expectations opposed to real particular desires, they are fragile: 
‘‘[T]he prescriptive force of a norm is derived by its perceived universality: If 
 
 103. Enric Martínez-Herrera & Thomas J. Miley, The Constitution and The Politics of 
National Identity in Spain, 16 NATIONS AND NATIONALISM, 6, 23–27 (2010). 
 104. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 178–79. 
 105. See BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 186–88. 
 106. See BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at188–93. 
 107. See BLOFIELD, supra note 22, at 78–79; Norris et al., supra note 54, at S50; Lete et al., 
supra note 22, at 76. 
 108. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 194. 
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people come to recognize that support for a given norm is limited or wavering, 
its power to induce conformity will be greatly reduced of even nullified.’’109 
Pluralistic ignorance norms are accompanied by informational cascades: 
individuals follow others observed behavior regardless of his own desires or 
preferences. Informational cascades are weak as they can easily change with 
new pieces of information. Change in informational cascades may suppose 
change in pluralistic ignorance norms. 
3.3. Bicchieri (2006) on norm change and civil disobedience 
Although we apply Bicchieri’s norm analysis based on expectations of 
civil disobedience, it must be noted that she believes that norms change due to 
fragile pluralistic ignorance norms, mistakes in following established norms, 
or technical, cooperative, or coordinative reasons.110 The action of subversive 
minorities is not, to her, a real reason. This is contrary to the hypothesis 
defended here. Bicchieri merely makes conclusory statements on the subject: 
 [B]ecause my explanations of such shifts does not rely on the existence of 
a few nonconformists, the combination of pluralistic ignorance with the 
possibility of ‘contravening a norm by mistake’ make the collapse of 
unpopular norms much more likely than it would otherwise be.111 
 [i]t follows that people are unlikely to consciously choose to deviate, but it 
is not unreasonable to assume that others believe the deviant’s off-equilibrium 
choice to reveal his true preference.112 
 [I]t would be a mistake to suppose that only the actions of a ‘subversive’ 
minority or the availability of public information about what most people 
really think (or like) could be expected to generate sudden and unexpected 
changes in well-established norms.113 
Actually Bicchieri believes norms emerge due to agents’ behavioral 
repetitions, beliefs about the existence of norms, and the spread of basic social-
dilemma norms into other areas. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper I have analyzed the concepts of norm given by Brennan et al 
and Bicchieri, and I have applied them to the concept of civil disobedience. 
I have considered civil disobedience as a kind of norm change process, 
having an established old norm and a new norm that clashes against the former, 
implying some kind of conflict. New norms emerge due to new purposes and 
 
 109. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 195. 
 110. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 195. 
 111. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 196. 
 112. BICCHIERI, supra note 2, at 205. 
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beneficial outcomes: they arise both as a way of fighting against the damages 
caused by the established norm and as a way of promoting new cooperation 
and coordination strategies and more beneficial outcomes. Problems start with 
different concepts of benefit among people. Thus, new pro-abortion, urban 
cycling, squatting, marijuana smoking, and new language norms emerge as a 
result of new expected benefits.114 
Coordination supposes an agreement reached when agents’ interests are 
aligned and cooperation means a pact between parties with different views and 
interests. As a result, coordination is usually less controversial and more stable 
than cooperation. New norm emergence is favored by some processes: two-
step processes, free-flowing cascades, follow-the-leader norm imposition, and 
norms from conventions. Old norm persistence is helped by change costs, 
change disinterest, change organization difficulties, particular historical 
comparisons, self-fulfilling expectations, and sinkholes: in short, fear of 
change and laziness. Norm change, based on follow-the-leader and free-
flowing cascades processes, is strengthened by old norm reinterpretations. 
People can breach the established norm in different ways: ignoring it, 
calculating the difference between complying with it and paying penalties, 
pretending to comply, disguising non-compliance, or escaping from the 
application of this norm. Bad norms may be adopted because of mistakes about 
facts or intentions of others –pluralistic ignorance – their multiple good and 
bad effects –with some people focusing on good effects and others on bad ones 
– and their virtues in the past but not currently. Finally we must note the 
difference between following a norm, when we internalize it and treat it as an 
end and not as a mean, and complying with a norm, acting according to the 
norm due to external instrumental considerations: followed norms are more 
difficult to change than complied norms. 
New norms emerge from particular agents or minorities, resulting in moral 
norms and attitudes. Then they spread, generating expectations, becoming 
social habits or customs –maybe conventions, as traffic rules history shows us 
– and finally, formal laws. So everything starts from a leader –or a leader 
 
 114. See generally Compains Clemente, supra note 27, at 8–14. The expected benefits can be 
communal or individual. In the latter case, they must be applied to every agent or most people in 
order for the new norm to have enough promoters and finally triumph. In the case of the 
Aragonese language, the initial benefit of changing the language into Spanish was just a benefit 
for the king, while the rest of the population remained disadvantaged as they did not speak 
Argonese. See generally Compains Clemente, supra note 27, at 8–14. But quickly Aragonese 
novelty adopted the new norm –the new language – in order to get the profits of speaking the 
king’s language. See generally Compains Clemente, supra note 27, at 8–14. Interestingly, 
Catalonian novelty,which had the same king but their own language, continued using their 
language and moreover they encouraged the new king to use it. See generally Compains 
Clemente, supra note 27, at 8–14. Hence, we find different benefits and sanctions related to both 
learning the new language and continuing with the one already established. 
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minority – who decides to follow an alternative norm. The nature and power of 
the leader may be political-institutional, as in the case of the Aragonese king 
and the linguistic substitution process, or popular. Civil disobedience is 
commonly related with popular power and it supposes some kind of conflict. 
Nevertheless, both processes are very similar: new norms emerge and spread in 
terms of statistical regularity. 
In norm change, we have accountability for followers of both the old and 
the new norm. As the new norm becomes more popular, the number of old 
norm violators increases and social disesteem, severity of sanction, number, 
and possibility of being sanctioned drop. On the contrary, old norm followers 
decrease, number of violators increase, and finally following this old norm 
may be sanctioned with more severity, social disesteem may increase, and this 
old norm becomes less and less popular. As we can consider different kinds of 
norms –moral particular norms, social non-formal norms, and formal laws – 
we also can establish different kinds of accountability and sanctions associated 
with it –strangeness, remorse, gossip, ostracism, and finally formal 
punishments. Norms’ status change depends on group size, disagreements 
about interpretations, efficiency, or epistemic access. When examining norms, 
we always find accountability and sanctions, in a broad sense. 
Groups having a norm –new or old –suppose internal expectations and 
sanctions among their members. Groups create roles, have their fashions, 
establish their culture, and finally their own identity. Many marijuana 
supporters usually follow Rastafarian aesthetics and squatters are likely to 
follow punk fads. For Brennan et al., group identity helps to explain how 
norms emerge and persist.115 For Bicchieri they imply descriptive norms that 
provide group cohesion and reinforce the initial social norm with its goals.116 
Group identity can maximize the gap between the old mainstream norm and 
the new subversive norm, and homogenizes the new community. Cultures 
create in-group expectations and make easier both cooperation and 
coordination. When analyzing norms in an in-group context, we also find 
patters of statistical regularity and accountability. To a certain extent, agents 
expect cultural and identity elements and norms in the rest of the in-group 
individuals. If these norms are not followed by an in-group agent, mistrust may 
appear as a kind of sanction. 
Contrary to Bicchieri, I believe that norms always imply some kind of 
accountability and sanctions. Social norms violated by an agent when he was 
expected to comply may not incur formal punishment, but will develop others 
sanctions like mistrust or gossip. Her view of descriptive norms and 
conventions also implies external expectation on agents: if an individual does 
not follow the mainstream fashion he will not be formally punished, but the 
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rest of people will give him odd looks. If we think of the alternative subversive 
in-group, the agent who does not follow their particular trends is likely to be 
viewed with some skepticism. If conventions are not followed and this leads to 
bad results, this action will quickly be sanctioned and these conventions may 
become social or formal norms. On the other hand, I do not agree with 
Brennan et al. about establishing a difference between norms generally 
followed and normative attitudes followed by few people. When talking about 
Rationally reconstructing why norms persist (section 6.6) and Internalizing 
norms (section 9.1) they make explicit this difference, although they admit 
there is no fixed number or proportion of people to jump from normative 
principles into norms. I believe that norms are established when a small group 
(no matter how small) shares a norm with its related in-group accountability 
and expectations: the previous step consists merely of having individual moral 
norms. 
It is important to remark that publicity is necessary when agents 
subversively try to substitute a norm. It shows the difference between civil 
disobedience as a way of changing norms and just taking profit from violating 
established norms. Furthermore, when the new norm is emerging and 
spreading, we are likely to work out new norm details for solving its mistakes 
and maybe adapting it to the old one. It should also be pointed out that norms 
are artificial creations, although groups and agents usually treat them as natural 
universals. Finally, norms activate because of both contextual and dispositional 
variables. 
To sum up, the definition of norm given by Brennan et al. is based on 
accountability: every norm has a related sanction if violated. They consider a 
broad definition of sanctions, implying consciousness charges (moral norms), 
social disappointment or gossip (social norms), and formal punishments 
(formal norms).117 On the other hand, Bicchieri considers norms in terms of 
expectations.118 Different kinds of norms –social norms, descriptive norms, 
and conventions – present different expectations –empirical expectations if we 
expect others, normative sanctions if we are expected by others – depending on 
different cooperation or coordination purposes. In other words, Brennan et al. 
based their view of norms on accountability and sanctions, while Bicchieri 
defines norm in terms of expected statistical regularity (her accurate analysis 
does not expect behavioral regularity but expectations’ regularity). 
Interestingly, if we look up norm in the Oxford Dictionaries we find: 
1. (the norm) Something that is usual, typical, or standard: this system has been 
the norm in Germany for decades 
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 1.1. (usually norms) A standard or pattern, especially of social behavior, 
that is typical or expected: the norms of good behavior in the civil service 
 1.2. A required standard; a level to be complied with or reached: the 7 % 
pay norm had been breached again.119 
In these definitions we have both the statistical component of norm 
(standard, pattern, typical, expected) and the accountability component 
(required, to be complied with). Thinking about sentences with norm and 
derivatives we can observe it easily: ‘Ongoing violence has become the norm’ 
(statistical regularity) and ‘The Council encourages the French authorities to 
fully respect this norm’ (accountability and possible sanctions). 
Having analyzed both Brennan et. al.’s and Bicchieri’s concept of norm 
and having applied it to some examples of civil disobedience, I consider that a 
broad integrative concept of norm, incorporating both expected statistical 
regularity and accountability, is necessary in order to work with norms and 
apply them to civil disobedience studies. Thus, this new concept of norm must: 
1. Imply common expectations (and thus, expected statistical regularity). 
So, 
  1.a. The agent must expect a particular behavior in most of other 
agents. 
 1.b. Other agents must expect a particular behavior in the former 
particular agent. 
2. Imply accountability. So failure to comply with a norm must be 
followed by a sanction. 
In order to get that, we need: 
A. To assume that common expectations (both 1.a. & 1.b.) are always 
necessary in order to get a norm. Note that Bicchieri only states 1.a. as 
necessary (1.b. was necessary only for social norms, but not for her descriptive 
norms and her conventions). 
B. To assume a broad concept of accountability and sanction, from 
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